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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Respondent
v.

:

PAUL TRAVIS REESE SANWICK,

:

Case No. 20176

Defendant-Appellant

PETITION FOR REHEARING
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a petition for rehearing of a per curiam decision
filed by this Court on August 15, 1985. Originally, this case
was an appeal from a guilty plea and conviction of rape, a first
degree felony, by Paul Travis Reese Sanwick.

Mr. Sanwick was

sentenced in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt
Lake County before Jay E. Banks, Judge, to five years to life
imprisonment on July 30, 1984.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts are set forth in the Brief of Appellant (Appellant's
Brief at 1-3).
ARGUMENT
In its per curiam opinion, State v. Sanwick, Opinion No.
20176 (Utah 1985\ the Court has either misapprehended or overlooked
the primary contention advanced in Appellant's Brief.

The opinion

seems to focus on the use of hearsay in the presentence report

and Appellant's opportunity to rebut the hearsay.

Appellant conceded

that the Rules of Evidence are not applicable to sentencing proceedings
(Appellant's Brief at 5) and now concedes that hearsay statements
may be included in presentence reports.

However, the point not

addressed by this Court in its opinion is the Appellant's contention
that the sentencing judge clearly violated statutory requirements
in the sentencing process (Appellant's Brief at 4 ) .
Utah Code Ann. §77-18-1(4) (previously §77-18-1(2)) (1953
as amended) states:
(4) Prior to imposition of any sentence for
an offense for which probation may be granted,
the court may, with the concurrence of the
defendant, continue the date for the imposition
of sentence for a reasonable period of time
for the purpose of obtaining a pre-sentence
report or information from other sources on
the defendant. The report shall be prepared
by the adult probation and parole section
of the Department of Corrections. The report
shall include a specific statement of pecuniary
damages, accompanied by a recommendation from
Adult Probation and Parole regarding the payment
of restitution by the defendant. The contents
of the report shall be confidential. The
court may disclose all or parts of the report
to the defendant or his counsel as the interest
of justice requires. At the time of sentence,
the court shall hear any testimony or information
the defendant or the prosecuting attorney
may wish to present concerning the appropriate
sentence. This testimony or information shall
be presented in open court on record and in
the presence of the defendant. (Emphasis
added)
This code section is neither vague nor ambiguous in its statement
that a trial judge "shall1' hear "any" evidence which a defendant
wishes to present at a sentencing proceeding.

-2-

The section clearly

requires that a defendant be allowed to present any evidence concerning
the sentence.

The judge is left with no discretion in the matter.

In the present case, defense counsel moved the trial court
for an order requiring the prosecutor to produce two witnesses
in the case, Tamara and Andara Sanwick, whose whereabouts were
apparently unknown to defense counsel (R. 33). The prosecutor
in the case had previously refused to voluntarily comply with
such a request (R. 60). The defendants attorney wanted the witnesses
to be available either for an informal interview or to present
testimony at the sentencing proceeding (R. 60). The witnesses
were vital to the defense to refute allegations of violence during
the crime.

The trial judge heard the defense motion four days

prior to the sentencing and summarily denied the motion even though
no opposition was presented by the prosecutor (R. 60).
It is this failure to follow the statutory requirements
which was raised in Appellant's Brief (p. 4) which this Court
failed to address in its opinion.

The failure to address this

issue led to some erroneous conclusions in the Courtfs opinion.
First, the opinion noted:

"To begin with, the trial court made

it clear in pronouncing sentence that the accusations of violence
did not form the exclusive basis for sending defendant to prison,
. . . ."

TA. at 2.

(Emphasis added)

However, if the accusations

of violence were false (which only the two witnesses in question
could have confirmed), then these accusations should have played
no part in the judge's sentencing decision.
Further, this Court's opinion stated:

"At the time of

sentencing, the court heard testimony defendant wanted to present

concerning the appropriate sentence."

Ld.

Finally, the opinion

said, "Defendant had every chance to examine fully and controvert
any prejudicial information that he claimed played a part in the
sentencing procedure.11

In fact, the trial judge1 s

I_d. at 3.

refusal to allow Mr. Sanwick to present or even interview two
vital witnesses makes both of these statements nonsequiturs.

At

the time of sentencing, the court did not hear testimony which
the defendant wanted to present.

Furthermore, the defendant did

not have a chance to controvert prejudicial information in the
sentencing procedure.
Procedural fairness is as important at the sentencing phase
as at the guilt phase of a criminal proceeding, State v. Casarez,
656 P.2d 1005 (Utah 1982), and further, the sentencing procedure
must fulfill the requirements of due process, State v. Lipsky,
608 P.2d 1241 (Utah 1980).

According to Utah Code Ann. §77-18-

1(4), supra, the Appellant should have been able to present any
testimony concerning his sentence.

However, a clearly erroneous

ruling by the trial court prevented Mr. Sanwick from presenting
such testimony.

The ruling, which is as yet uncorrected, effectively

denied Mr. Sanwick due process of law.
CONCLUSION
Because this Court either misapprehended or overlooked
Appellant's primary contention in its decision in this case, the
Appellant respectfully petitions this Court to reconsider that
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decision and reverse and remand his sentence for redetermination.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

day of August, 1985.

CURTIS NESSET
Attorney for Petitioner

I hereby certify that I delivered

copies of the foregoing

to the Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol Building,
Salt Lake City, Utah, this

day of August, 1985.
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(1)

I am the attorney for Appellant/Petitioner in this

case and;
(2)

This Petition for Rehearing is presented to this Court

in good faith and not to delay any matter in this case.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

day of August, 1985.

